A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves outcomes consistent with a social choice function. We identify a robust monotonicity condition that is necessary and (with mild extra assumptions) sufficient for robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. It requires that there not be too much interdependence of types. We characterize robust monotonicity for some interesting economic environments. We identify conditions where, ...
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be dist...
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable co...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the playe...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choic...
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation s...
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify...
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be dist...
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable co...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implemented if every equilibrium on every type space achieves o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process o...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment among the playe...
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizab...
The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choic...
We consider robust virtual implementation, where robustness is the requirement that implementation s...
We analyze the problem of fully implementing a social choice set in ex post equilibrium. We identify...
In a general interdependent preference environment, we characterize when two payoff types can be dist...
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable co...
We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A determinist...