Add to ORKGThis paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisions can achieve approximate efficiency. We provide regularity conditions under which a Groves mechanism amended with a veto game implements an efficient outcome with probability arbitrarily close to one, and satisfies interim participation, incentive and resource constraints
Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria are ubiqu...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods ar...
This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisio...
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie...
Quota mechanisms are commonly used to elicit private information when agents face multiple decisions...
A large body of theoretical and experimental literature suggests that exogenously imposed infinite ...
For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanis...
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual pr...
One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the nu...
Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private infor...
We introduce a class of two-player cooperation games where each player faces a binary decision, ente...
In our experiment, we have a multiple-round public goods game but with a probabilistic endpoint. Thi...
Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. ...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria are ubiqu...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods ar...
This paper shows that linking a sufficiently large number of independent but unrelated social decisio...
We consider bargaining problems in which parties have access to outside options, the size of the pie...
Quota mechanisms are commonly used to elicit private information when agents face multiple decisions...
A large body of theoretical and experimental literature suggests that exogenously imposed infinite ...
For groups that must make several decisions of similar form, we define a simple and general mechanis...
Before a group can take a decision, its members must agree on a mechanism to aggregate individual pr...
One might expect that, in pure coordination games, coordination would become less frequent as the nu...
Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private infor...
We introduce a class of two-player cooperation games where each player faces a binary decision, ente...
In our experiment, we have a multiple-round public goods game but with a probabilistic endpoint. Thi...
Matching mechanisms have been proposed to improve public good provision in voluntary contributions. ...
In a mechanism design problem, participation constraints require that all types prefer the proposed ...
Coordination problems resembling weakest-link games with multiple Pareto ranked equilibria are ubiqu...
This paper considers the implementation of an economic outcome under complete information when the s...
It is well known that ex post efficient mechanisms for the provision of indivisible public goods ar...