ICE: A Passive, high-speed, state-continuity scheme (extended version)

The amount of trust that can be placed in commodity computing platforms is limited by the likelihood of vulnerabilities in their huge software stacks. Protected-module architectures, such as Intel SGX, provide an interesting alternative by isolating the execution of software modules. To minimize the amount of code that provides support for the protected-module architecture, persistent storage of (confidentiality and integrity protected) states of modules can be delegated to the untrusted operating system. But precautions should be taken to ensure state continuity: an attacker should not be able to cause a module to use stale states (a so-called rollback attack), and while the system is not under attack, a module should always be able to make progress, even when the system could crash or lose power at unexpected, random points in time (i.e., the system should be crash-resilient).nrpages: 17status: publishe