An Elimination of Pei-Rong Fu's Challenge of the Innate Goodness of Human Nature

作為儒家人性論的最權威詮釋，人性本善論在長遠的中國思想史上幾乎沒有遭受到嚴重的挑戰。很少有人追問：什麼叫人性本善？它的成立有何根據？也很少有人反省：儒者固謂善性和惡欲可共存於人身，然而兩者之共存是否真的理所當然？難道它們沒有互相排斥的可能？顯然易見的是，在上述問題沒有得到解答之前，我們有何理據接受「人性本善」這樣的觀念？在各項傳統儒學觀點皆受當代新儒家這個強大哲學陣營主導的中國思想界，傅佩榮是少數力排眾議，對人性本善論持批判態度的學者之一。根據他的看法，「人性本善」此一提法不止不合先秦儒家古義，而且無法在一般人生經驗中獲得印證。不管傅佩榮的批評是否成立，他的研究最少迫使我們重新反省「人性本善」一說的意涵、其賴以成立的理據，以及諸如「人性和道德之關係」、「善惡怎樣並存」、「道德修養如何可能」等思想義理問題。As the most authoritative interpretation of Confucian theory of human nature, the view that human nature is innately good has never confronted with a grave challenge in the long history of Chinese thought. The following are questions that are rarely asked: What is it meant by the phrase renxing ben shan or ＂human nature is innately good?＂ How can this thesis be justified? Should it be not taken for granted that the goodness of human nature is compatible with desires, given the teachings of Confucians? It seems so reasonable that, until the questions above are answered, we can be said to have no duty to take the existence of innate goodness as one of our beliefs. Beyond the influence of contemporary Neo-Confucianism, which dominates the interpretation of traditional Confucian philosophy, Pei-rong Fu, who belongs to the minority taking a critical attitude toward Confucianism, provides a comprehensive review for Neo-Confucian approval of the innate goodness, arguing that it is wrong to interpret xingshan as renxing ben shan, and that it is impossible to confirm such a theory in our everyday life. Whether Fu's criticisms are successful or not, what he has discussed can be considered an access to an re-examination of the expression of renxing ben shan, by which we are able to form a clearer concept of its connection with issues including the distinction between human nature and morality, the compatibility between goodness and badness, as well as the feasibility of moral cultivation