Consequentialism and the Problem of Collectively Produced Harm

It is sometimes argued that in certain instances of collectively produced harm, although very many contributory actions are harmful, it is nevertheless the case that each individual contributory action makes no morally relevant difference to the collectively produced outcome. Let us refer to these as ‘no-difference cases’. Most philosophers agree that if no-difference cases exist, they pose a problem for consequentialists. Roughly, if each individual contributory action makes no morally relevant difference to the collectively produced outcome, then although these actions are cumulatively harmful, ordinary consequentialist principles suggest that each individual is objectively permitted to contribute. It follows that even if everyone were to adhere to ordinary consequentialist principles, they might nevertheless fail to produce optimal consequences. When responding to this problem, consequentialists typically argue that because no-difference cases cannot possibly exist, consequentialists need not be troubled by them. I disagree. In the first half of my thesis, I argue that no-difference cases are at least somewhat plausible. Therefore, these cases do raise problems for consequentialists. In the second half of my thesis, I suggest a variety of ways in which consequentialists might respond to these problems. I argue that even if no-difference cases exist, they need not entirely undermine consequentialism