Add to ORKGTwo contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastructure levels in a first stage, then compete in tax. We compare the properties of subgame perfect nash equilibria in this stage-game depending on the intrisic features of the infrastructure considered. Then we derive some implications regarding the scope for cooperation between the regions
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructur...
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus seg...
In a common market with costless mobility of all factors, regional governments can attract mobile fi...
Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastru...
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructu...
Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of new resident...
A dynamic model of inter-governmental competition for investment is presented, where the investment ...
The European Union provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, ...
The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructu...
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric r...
This work envisages effects of fiscal competition in terms both tax rate and public spending on the ...
Han Y, Pieretti P, Zou B. On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes an...
Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with ...
This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign go...
Impact of positive public good spillovers on international capital tax competition in a spatial econ...
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructur...
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus seg...
In a common market with costless mobility of all factors, regional governments can attract mobile fi...
Two contiguous regions compete to attract a population of heterogeneous firms. They choose infrastru...
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructu...
Tax and public service competition between local governments concerning localisation of new resident...
A dynamic model of inter-governmental competition for investment is presented, where the investment ...
The European Union provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructures, ...
The European Union (EU) provides coordination and financing of trans-European transport infrastructu...
We analyze Nash equilibrium in fiscal competition with tax and public investment between symmetric r...
This work envisages effects of fiscal competition in terms both tax rate and public spending on the ...
Han Y, Pieretti P, Zou B. On the desirability of tax coordination when countries compete in taxes an...
Revenue sharing can be used to discourage low tax regions from competing for capital and firms with ...
This paper addresses the problem of partial tax coordination among regional or national sovereign go...
Impact of positive public good spillovers on international capital tax competition in a spatial econ...
We construct a model of corporate tax competition in which governments also use public infrastructur...
Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are differentiated by quality, thus seg...
In a common market with costless mobility of all factors, regional governments can attract mobile fi...