Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. Instead, a new round of competition begins, with legislators as voters and party leaders as candidates. The offices at stake are what we call “mega?seats.” We consider the selection of three different types of mega?seats—cabinet portfolios, seats on directing boards, and permanent committee chairs—in 57 democratic assemblies. If winning parties select the rules by which mega?seats are chosen and those rules affect which parties can attain mega?seats (one important payoff of “winning”), then parties and rules should coevolve in the long run. We find two main patterns relating to legislative party systems and a country's length of experience with...
Scholars of electoral systems (e.g., Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) argue that a combination of electoral ...
This research investigates how patterns of legislative competition (i.e. partisan fragmentation and ...
In this paper we develop a basic model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty syste...
Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. In...
A common approach among scholars is depicting electoral democracy as a two-round competition for off...
There is a spectrum of parties that exist in foundational elections in new democracies and the resea...
Defence date: 17 September 2013Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI (Supervisor) Profe...
This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s tran-sition to democracy...
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coal...
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coal...
In this paper we study a coordination dilemma that appears in democracies where the Upper and Lower ...
How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed-me...
This article focuses on party preferences for types of electoral systems in Spanish regional parliam...
In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two histo...
Westminster-derived parliamentary systems are typically associated with two party systems and single...
Scholars of electoral systems (e.g., Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) argue that a combination of electoral ...
This research investigates how patterns of legislative competition (i.e. partisan fragmentation and ...
In this paper we develop a basic model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty syste...
Parties neither cease to exist nor cease to compete for office when the general election is over. In...
A common approach among scholars is depicting electoral democracy as a two-round competition for off...
There is a spectrum of parties that exist in foundational elections in new democracies and the resea...
Defence date: 17 September 2013Examining Board: Professor Stefano Bartolini, EUI (Supervisor) Profe...
This paper discusses the role of electoral institutional design in Mexico’s tran-sition to democracy...
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coal...
We present a theoretical model of a parliamentary democracy, where party structures, government coal...
In this paper we study a coordination dilemma that appears in democracies where the Upper and Lower ...
How do electoral incentives affect legislative organization? Through an analysis of Japan’s mixed-me...
This article focuses on party preferences for types of electoral systems in Spanish regional parliam...
In consensual (proportional) highly fragmented multiparty settings, political parties have two histo...
Westminster-derived parliamentary systems are typically associated with two party systems and single...
Scholars of electoral systems (e.g., Duverger 1954; Rae 1967) argue that a combination of electoral ...
This research investigates how patterns of legislative competition (i.e. partisan fragmentation and ...
In this paper we develop a basic model of endogenous choice of electoral rules in a multiparty syste...