A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to undergo. This chapter focuses on three issues concerning such experiences. The first issue is the so-called ‘transparency’ of experiences. The chapter distinguishes a number of different interpretations of the suggestion that visual experiences are ‘transparent’. It then discusses in what sense, if any, visual experiences are ‘transparent’, and what further conclusions one can draw from that. The second issue is which properties we are presented with in visual experiences. It is widely accepted that we sometimes experience red for example. But exactly which properties do we sometimes visually experience, and which properties do we neve...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
Recently, psychologists and neuroscientists have provided a great deal of evidence showing that perc...
This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal...
A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to ...
Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience th...
It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. T...
I argue that the central question in the philosophy of perception is the question of whether percept...
The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects fr...
Our visual experiences of the world around us deliver information about the visible features of the ...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides...
How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do...
Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In...
P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate...
This book offers an account of perceptual experience—its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the w...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
Recently, psychologists and neuroscientists have provided a great deal of evidence showing that perc...
This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal...
A visual experience, as understood here, is a sensory event that is conscious, or like something to ...
Both visual experience and conscious thought represent external objects, but in visual experience th...
It is part of the phenomenology of perceptual experiences that objects seem to be presented to us. T...
I argue that the central question in the philosophy of perception is the question of whether percept...
The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects fr...
Our visual experiences of the world around us deliver information about the visible features of the ...
I defend a subjective representationalist theory of phenomenal experience. On this view, phenomenal ...
I argue against one way of understanding the claim that how one’s visual experience “seems” provides...
How should we characterize the functional role of conscious visual experience? In particular, how do...
Conscious experiences involve subjective qualities, such as colours, sounds, smells and emotions. In...
P.F. Strawson argued that ‘mature sensible experience (in general) presents itself as … an immediate...
This book offers an account of perceptual experience—its intrinsic nature, its engagement with the w...
What is at stake in the debate on whether experience should be understood as having content? This qu...
Recently, psychologists and neuroscientists have provided a great deal of evidence showing that perc...
This paper argues that various phenomenological considerations support a non-representational causal...