Not all family firms are equal: The moderating effect of family involvement on the political risk exposure of the foreign direct investment portfolio. Preliminary evidence from Spanish multinational enterprises

We investigate the effect of political risk (PR) exposure and family control on the internationalization strategy of multinational enterprises (MNEs) using social capital theory. Our results from a negative binomial cross-sectional analysis in 2007 of Spanish MNEs show family ownership or the limited presence of family members on the board has no effect on internationalization. However, when the conceptualization of family firms (FFs) includes majority ownership and board presence, we find a direct negative effect on their internationalization scope but a positive moderating effect on the relationship between the exposure to PR and internationalization scope. FFs have some specific advantages suitable to be employed in their corporate political activity allowing them to develop long-lasting relationships with relevant political actors. By disentangling the effects of family control on internationalization and PR, this article explains how FFs can be simultaneously risk-willing and risk-averse