A comparative analysis of the two Tibetan Prasangika Madhyamika accounts of the two truths

The primary objective of this dissertation is to demonstrate that the Tibetan Prasangika Madhyamika offers at least two radically distinct philosophical and hermeneutic approaches concerning the doctrine of the two truths and to explain the nature of the distinction between those accounts. Given the widespread tendency to construe the Tibetan Prasangika as constituting a single homogeneous system (especially among Theravadin scholars), the dissertation not only has implications for the understanding of the two approaches that are the focus of discussion, but also for the broader understanding of the Tibetan Prasangika in general. The two approaches at issue here are associated with the Tibetan Prasangika thinkers Tsong khapa (A.D. 1357-1423) and Go rampa (A.D. 1429- 1489). The dissertation focuses on a comparative analysis of their conception of the two truths—providing an account of their respective definitions of the two truths, their accounts of the relationship between the two truths, the ontological status of the two truths, the epistemic resources for accessing the two truths, the problems concerning the limits of language and thought as these relate to the notion of ultimate truth, the different modes of realising ultimate truth, and, finally, the nature and possibility of knowledge of the two truths and the implications of such knowledge for the attainment of enlightenment. Through the comparative analysis of Tsong khapa and Go ramp a on these issues, the dissertation demonstrates where, why and how the two Tibetan readings of the original Indian sources exhibit distinct and independent characters