OBJECTIVITY OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT

UID/FIL/00183/2019In this entry it is discussed the problem of the "objectivity of aesthetic judgment" as Kant understands it in the framework of the third Critique. One of the most strong available solution of the problem would be a kind of realistic notion under the principle of "perfection" of the aesthetic object. Then the objectivity would be justified by a set of qualities belonging to the object itself. But the fact is that the judgment of taste is completely independent of any concept of perfection ((sic) 15). A critique of the aesthetic judgment shows that its universality and necessity are qualities that cannot be separated from a general principle of communication between subjectivities. So the objectivity of such a judgment is not that of a judgment of knowledge, which is based on the concept of the object, but the kind objectivity that is associated of a universal communication between subjectivities. Yet it must be stressed a most central element: it is a transcendental presupposition that legitimates all the universality and necessity of the aesthetic judgment, beyond the universal consensus: the idea of a ubersinnliche ground of nature, which is the presupposition of the exercise of aesthetic judgment in general.publishersversionpublishe