Certain characteristics of managerial employment arrangements and of the managerial labor market make shareholder wealth dependent on an executive's continued employment. These wealth effects are investigated by examining the common stock price reaction to unexpected deaths of senior corporate executives. Abnormal stock price changes are documented for a sample of fifty-three events. These abnormal stock price changes are associated with the executive's status as a corporate founder and with measures of the executive's `talents' and decision-making responsibility, and of the transaction costs associated with renegotiating or terminating the employment agreement.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/25717/1/0000274.pd
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We hypothesize that managers who receive high equity-based compensation have greater incentive to av...
This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock-based compensation on firms' d...
I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Al...
An efficient managerial labor market should compensate executives according to their contribution to...
Deaths of executives provide a special case to explore management turnover since the decision to lea...
Using stock price reactions to sudden deaths of top executives as a measure of expected contribution...
The main purpose of this project is to investigate if the sudden death of an executive will affect t...
Executive replacements have historically created fluctuations in the market value of a company and p...
This paper examines the connection between layoffs, executive pay, and stock prices. Firms that anno...
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of high-level executives joining the Boa...
Corporate executives are paid at extremely high levels compared to lower-level employees, especially...
The potential for agency conflict, due to separation of ownership and control, is an important issue...
This article presents a study which examined the direction of stock returns after reports of sudden ...
This study analyzes the role of three incentive devices in managerial compensation: pay for performa...
I investigate the relation between CEO equity compensation and employee layoffs. In particular, this...
We hypothesize that managers who receive high equity-based compensation have greater incentive to av...
This article considers the effect of vesting conditions of stock-based compensation on firms' d...
I investigate whether equity grants increase the costs of CEO dismissal or departure (Oyer, 2004; Al...