There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS") mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the U.K., though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark
In February 1998 the Dutch government auctioned licences to operate mobile telecommunications networ...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
During 2000 several European countries have auctioned UMTS licences. Holders of these 3G licenses ca...
This paper analyses the procedures used by different European countries for awarding spectrum licenc...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to op...
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-p...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the ...
In February 1998 the Dutch government auctioned licences to operate mobile telecommunications networ...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
During 2000 several European countries have auctioned UMTS licences. Holders of these 3G licenses ca...
This paper analyses the procedures used by different European countries for awarding spectrum licenc...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to op...
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-p...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the ...
In February 1998 the Dutch government auctioned licences to operate mobile telecommunications networ...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...