There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') mobile-phone license auctions, from 20 Euros per capita in Switzerland to 650 Euros per capita in the UK, though the values of the licences sold were similar. Poor auction designs in some countries facilitated collusion between firms and failed to attract entrants. The sequencing of the auctions was also crucial. We discuss the auctions in the UK, Netherlands, Germany, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium, Greece and Denmark
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
This paper analyses the procedures used by different European countries for awarding spectrum licenc...
During 2000 several European countries have auctioned UMTS licences. Holders of these 3G licenses ca...
The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to op...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-p...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile ...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European 'third generation' (3G, or 'MTS') ...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
There were enormous differences in the revenues from the European "third generation" (3G, or "UMTS")...
This paper analyses the procedures used by different European countries for awarding spectrum licenc...
During 2000 several European countries have auctioned UMTS licences. Holders of these 3G licenses ca...
The spectrum for third generation (3G) mobile communications for the German market was alloted to op...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
This paper reviews the part played by economists in organizing the British third-generation mobile-p...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
The third generation UMTS auction in Germany raised an enormous amount of revenue, and at the same t...
This article studies bidding behaviour in the auction of radio spectrum for third generation mobile ...
The most important issues in auction design are the traditional concerns of competition policy preve...
I suggest explanations for the apparently puzzling bidding in the year 2000 British and German 3G te...
Eight previously published papers address the theory of auctions, practical auction design, and the ...