Add to ORKGIn this paper, I show that Lewis' definition of coherence and Fitelson's and Shogenji's measures of coherence are unacceptable because they entail the absurdity that any set of beliefs in general is coherent and not coherent at the same time. This devastating result is obtained if a simple and plausible principle of stability for coherence is accepted
Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see ...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
Tomoji Shogenji (1999) argues that beliefs that are more coherent need not thereby be more likely to...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of th...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense th...
this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it is a self-contained continuation of Spohn (1991). I studi...
<p class="western" style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"><span style="font-family: Verdana,...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
The core of scientific theories are laws. These laws often make use of theoretical terms, linguistic...
This paper aims to show what makes coherentism as an epistemological position attractive in comparis...
This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of...
Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see ...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
Tomoji Shogenji (1999) argues that beliefs that are more coherent need not thereby be more likely to...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Coherentism in epistemology has long suffered from lack of formal and quantitative explication of th...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
Recent works in epistemology show that the claim that coherence is truth conducive – in the sense th...
this paper is twofold. On the one hand, it is a self-contained continuation of Spohn (1991). I studi...
<p class="western" style="margin-bottom: 0in; line-height: 100%;"><span style="font-family: Verdana,...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
The core of scientific theories are laws. These laws often make use of theoretical terms, linguistic...
This paper aims to show what makes coherentism as an epistemological position attractive in comparis...
This paper sets out to demonstrate that a contrast can be drawn between coherentism as an account of...
Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see ...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...