Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justify a belief? Coherentists answer in the negative: Only a belief can justify a belief. A perceptual experience can cause a belief but cannot justify a belief. Coherentists eschew all noninferential justification—justification independent of evidential support from beliefs—and, with it, the idea that justification has a foundation. Instead, justification is holistic in structure. Beliefs are justified together, not in isolation, as members of a coherent belief system. The main question of the paper is whether coherentism is consistent. I set out an apparent inconsistency in coherentism and then give a resolution to that apparent inconsistency
1. There is a way of thinking about epistemic justification that holds that it dwells solely in beli...
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and...
This paper is the first part of a series of articles about the structure of justification. I outline...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a con...
This study investigates the relationship between coherence and epistemic justification. Part One is ...
Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s ...
This paper aims to show what makes coherentism as an epistemological position attractive in comparis...
It is sometimes assumed in the Bayesian coherentist literature that the project of finding a truth-c...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
1. There is a way of thinking about epistemic justification that holds that it dwells solely in beli...
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and...
This paper is the first part of a series of articles about the structure of justification. I outline...
Can a perceptual experience justify (epistemically) a belief? More generally, can a nonbelief justif...
Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, t...
Problems for coherentism come in two forms. The fundamental issue that coherentists have not been ve...
A common objection to coherence theories of justification comes from belief revision processes: in a...
An argument is presented which shows that coherence theories of justification are committed to a con...
This study investigates the relationship between coherence and epistemic justification. Part One is ...
Plantinga argues that cases involving ‘fixed’ beliefs refute the coherentist thesis that a belief’s ...
This paper aims to show what makes coherentism as an epistemological position attractive in comparis...
It is sometimes assumed in the Bayesian coherentist literature that the project of finding a truth-c...
Perhaps the most fundamental question of epistemology asks on what grounds our knowledge of the worl...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
This paper examines the role of coherence as a source of epistemic justification, particularly the a...
1. There is a way of thinking about epistemic justification that holds that it dwells solely in beli...
In a recent article, Peter Gärdenfors (1992) has suggested that the AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and...
This paper is the first part of a series of articles about the structure of justification. I outline...