One-time signature schemes rely on hash functions and are, therefore, assumed to be resistant to attacks by quantum computers. These approaches inherently raise a key management problem, as the key pair can be used only for one message. That means, for one-time signature schemes to work, the sender must deliver the veri�cation key together with the message and the signature. Upon reception, the receiver has to verify the authenticity of the veri�cation key before verifying the signature itself. Hash-tree based solutions tackle this problem by basing the authenticity of a large number of veri�cation keys on the authenticity of a root key. This approach, however, causes computation, communication, and storage overhead. Due to hardware a...
The use of public key cryptosystems range from securely encrypting emails and files to creating digi...
The potential advent of quantum computers in coming years has motivated security researchers to star...
The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital sig...
One-time signature schemes rely on hash functions and are, therefore, assumed to be resistant to att...
One-time signatures have been known for more than two decades, and have been studied mainly due to t...
This paper introduces a high-security post-quantum stateless hash-based signature scheme that signs ...
This paper introduces a high-security post-quantum stateless hash-based signature scheme that signs ...
Abstract. We present new ideas for decreasing the size of secure memory needed for hardware imple-me...
Digital signatures are essential for the security of computer networks such as the Internet. For exa...
One-time signatures have been known for more than two decades, and have been studied mainly due to t...
Status quo Providing efficient PKC in embedded systems is challenging Side-channel attacks are a s...
A new post-quantum, hash-based signature (HBS) scheme is introduced. In known HBS, the size and cost...
Abstract. We show how to extend hash-tree based data signatures to server-assisted personal digital ...
The Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) algorithm is commonly used for two-factor authentication. In...
Inspired by the blockchain architecture and existing Merkle tree based signature schemes, we propose...
The use of public key cryptosystems range from securely encrypting emails and files to creating digi...
The potential advent of quantum computers in coming years has motivated security researchers to star...
The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital sig...
One-time signature schemes rely on hash functions and are, therefore, assumed to be resistant to att...
One-time signatures have been known for more than two decades, and have been studied mainly due to t...
This paper introduces a high-security post-quantum stateless hash-based signature scheme that signs ...
This paper introduces a high-security post-quantum stateless hash-based signature scheme that signs ...
Abstract. We present new ideas for decreasing the size of secure memory needed for hardware imple-me...
Digital signatures are essential for the security of computer networks such as the Internet. For exa...
One-time signatures have been known for more than two decades, and have been studied mainly due to t...
Status quo Providing efficient PKC in embedded systems is challenging Side-channel attacks are a s...
A new post-quantum, hash-based signature (HBS) scheme is introduced. In known HBS, the size and cost...
Abstract. We show how to extend hash-tree based data signatures to server-assisted personal digital ...
The Time-based One-Time Password (TOTP) algorithm is commonly used for two-factor authentication. In...
Inspired by the blockchain architecture and existing Merkle tree based signature schemes, we propose...
The use of public key cryptosystems range from securely encrypting emails and files to creating digi...
The potential advent of quantum computers in coming years has motivated security researchers to star...
The unavoidable transition to post-quantum cryptography requires dependable quantum-safe digital sig...