EU import notifications as a protectionist move: an examination of the relation between tariff and non-tariff barriers in seafood trade

Since the creation of the GATT and the WTO, one of the main goals has been to decrease trade barriers and increase openness in trade. However, there has been concern that as importing countries honor WTO commitments and lower tariff rates, they may be replacing traditional tariff barriers with non-tariff barriers. Recent literature has found that the implementation of food safety standards, specifically the use of import notifications and rejections, has acted as a significant barrier to trade in both the EU and the US. This thesis empirically examines the relation between declining tariff rates and a count of EU seafood import notifications as a measure of non-tariff barriers. Possible motives for the use of import notifications are divided into two categories: risk and protectionism. The results provide evidence showing not only a negative relation between tariff and non-tariff barriers, but possible illegitimate use of import notifications by importing countries with a high need for protection