Targeted impersonation as a tool for the detection of biometric system vulnerabilities

This paper argues that biometric verification evaluations can obscure vulnerabilities that increase the chances that an attacker could be falsely accepted. This can occur because existing evaluations implicitly assume that an imposter claiming a false identity would claim a random identity rather than consciously selecting a target to impersonate. This paper shows how an attacker can select a target with a similar biometric signature in order to increase their chances of false acceptance. It demonstrates this effect using a publicly available iris recognition algorithm. The evaluation shows that the system can be vulnerable to attackers targeting subjects who are enrolled with a smaller section of iris due to occlusion. The evaluation shows how the traditional DET curve analysis conceals this vulnerability. As a result, traditional analysis underestimates the importance of an existing score normalisation method for addressing occlusion. The paper concludes by evaluating how the targeted false acceptance rate increases with the number of available targets. Consistent with a previous investigation of targeted face verification performance, the experiment shows that the false acceptance rate can be modelled using the traditional FAR measure with an additional term that is proportional to the logarithm of the number of available targets