The Priest/Klein model predicts both trial rates and plaintiff win rates as functions of three structural parameters: the decision standard, parties\u27 uncertainty in estimating case quality, and the degree of stake asymmetry across parties. Previous tests of the model are unsatisfactory because most have concentrated on its prediction of a 50 percent win rate, which only obtains as a limiting case. We gather independent evidence that describes the model\u27s three parameters and compare it with estimates from a structural model that simultaneously estimates both trial and win rates. The model fits the data for four of our six case types. A four-parameter model, in which plaintiffs face greater uncertainty than defendants, can explain the ...
This paper analyzes the signaling nature of litigation selection under asymmetric information. For t...
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations re...
We consider a model of litigation in which some defendants have insufficient assets to pay a judgmen...
The Priest/Klein model predicts both trial rates and plaintiff win rates as functions of three struc...
The selection hypothesis of Priest and Klein explains the selection of cases for trial, from the und...
This paper develops implications of the selection hypothesis of George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein ...
The Priest-Klein model predicts that a decline in the plaintiff win rate might be explained by a cha...
In this paper I introduce what I call the reduced form approach to studying the plaintiff\u27s win r...
In their 1984 article, Priest and Klein show that a simple divergent expectations model of the decis...
Priest and Klein argued in 1984 that, because of selection effects, the percentage of litigated case...
Employment discrimination cases filed during recessions are more likely to settle after filing and l...
What explains the decision to litigate rather than settle a dispute? The standard theoretical approa...
Recent law and economics scholarship has produced much theoretical and empirical work on how and why...
This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the decision to comply ...
This paper analyzes the signaling nature of litigation selection under asymmetric information. For t...
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations re...
We consider a model of litigation in which some defendants have insufficient assets to pay a judgmen...
The Priest/Klein model predicts both trial rates and plaintiff win rates as functions of three struc...
The selection hypothesis of Priest and Klein explains the selection of cases for trial, from the und...
This paper develops implications of the selection hypothesis of George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein ...
The Priest-Klein model predicts that a decline in the plaintiff win rate might be explained by a cha...
In this paper I introduce what I call the reduced form approach to studying the plaintiff\u27s win r...
In their 1984 article, Priest and Klein show that a simple divergent expectations model of the decis...
Priest and Klein argued in 1984 that, because of selection effects, the percentage of litigated case...
Employment discrimination cases filed during recessions are more likely to settle after filing and l...
What explains the decision to litigate rather than settle a dispute? The standard theoretical approa...
Recent law and economics scholarship has produced much theoretical and empirical work on how and why...
This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the decision to comply ...
This paper analyzes the signaling nature of litigation selection under asymmetric information. For t...
Parties engaged in a litigation generally enter the discovery process with different informations re...
We consider a model of litigation in which some defendants have insufficient assets to pay a judgmen...