Add to ORKGProfessors Butler and Ribstein present an extensive analysis of opting out of fiduciary duties, based on the contractual theory of the corporation and a substantial body of economic literature, as well as a comprehensive response to prominent corporate law commentators who have argued that private ordering of corporate manager duties should be restricted by mandatory legal rules
A significant implication arising out of an increasingly influential view that fiduciary duties are ...
Applying basic economic analysis to the corporate form is useful for a variety of reasons. Not least...
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of both public and closel...
Professors Butler and Ribstein present an extensive analysis of opting out of fiduciary duties, base...
The impact of the law and economics movement on legal scholarship, legal analysis, and, ultimately, ...
After surveying the Perfect-Markets analysis in Section I of this Article, Section II explores some ...
Larry Ribstein, throughout his remarkable scholarly career, developed a theory formed around his ana...
The article identifies a worrisome trend in corporate law and scholarship. Across seemingly unrelate...
This Article consists of four parts. Part I draws a profile of fiduciary relationships. It also expl...
For centuries, the duty of loyalty has been the hallowed centerpiece of fiduciary obligation, widely...
A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or half empty. The structure of Am...
This Article intends to reconcile two competing paradigms within the law and economics model of corp...
Corporate-law scholarship for decades has been occupied with agency costs and how to mitigate them. ...
This article wades into the debate between contractarians and anti-contractarians over the extent to...
To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors\u27 fiduciary du...
A significant implication arising out of an increasingly influential view that fiduciary duties are ...
Applying basic economic analysis to the corporate form is useful for a variety of reasons. Not least...
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of both public and closel...
Professors Butler and Ribstein present an extensive analysis of opting out of fiduciary duties, base...
The impact of the law and economics movement on legal scholarship, legal analysis, and, ultimately, ...
After surveying the Perfect-Markets analysis in Section I of this Article, Section II explores some ...
Larry Ribstein, throughout his remarkable scholarly career, developed a theory formed around his ana...
The article identifies a worrisome trend in corporate law and scholarship. Across seemingly unrelate...
This Article consists of four parts. Part I draws a profile of fiduciary relationships. It also expl...
For centuries, the duty of loyalty has been the hallowed centerpiece of fiduciary obligation, widely...
A half-filled glass of water can be described as either half full or half empty. The structure of Am...
This Article intends to reconcile two competing paradigms within the law and economics model of corp...
Corporate-law scholarship for decades has been occupied with agency costs and how to mitigate them. ...
This article wades into the debate between contractarians and anti-contractarians over the extent to...
To economically oriented corporate law professors, distinguishing between directors\u27 fiduciary du...
A significant implication arising out of an increasingly influential view that fiduciary duties are ...
Applying basic economic analysis to the corporate form is useful for a variety of reasons. Not least...
Under traditional state and corporate law doctrine, officers and directors of both public and closel...