Duty and the nature of God : a pragmatic reconstruction of Berkeley's divine command theory of moral obligation

George Berkeley's moral philosophy postulates the commands of God as constitutive of moral obligation. However there are different forms that a divine command ethics can take, and the form that Berkeley's takes has not received the attention that has been paid to his metaphysical theism. The most common interpretation would have Berkeley respond to the question posed in Plato's Euthyphro by insisting that moral predicates are applicable purely on the basis of God's so deeming them, rather that by allowing that God recognises a propriety of application that would yet be proper were God not to recognise it. This interpretation is encouraged by what Berkeley says in Passive Obedience. However I challenge this interpretation, on the strength of what Berkeley has to say in Alciphron, his Essays, his Sermons, the Principles of Human Knowledge and a variety of other sources. My thesis contends that Berkeley in fact offers two, radically different theses that conclude with a version of the divine command theory of ethics. He holds that, given certain divine attributes which are empirically verifiable by people, God's commands serve an epistemological function; logically, they indicate the best possible actions people should undertake. This argument is not a success, however, because the attributes in question are not suggested by empirical investigation as Berkeley thinks; Hume's objections to Berkeley's style of argument in this area are sufficient to block it. However, while this reason to treat divine commands as prescriptively exhaustive is not compelling, Berkeley produces an alternative route to the same conclusion that is informed by a different type of reason people have for adopting beliefs. Berkeley, I argue, is a pragmatist, and is committed to the legitimacy and rationality of adopting beliefs on the basis of their conduciveness to securing certain ends, as long as minimal evidential considerations are met - that they do not tell against the proposition in question. He argues persistently that an intelligent grasp of what people wish their activities to achieve, including the activity of accepting propositional belief, will reveal the necessity of adopting the belief that our moral duty is defined by the will of God (as well as the subsidiary beliefs that this involves, such as that God exists and has a certain nature). Berkeley's pioneering pragmatism has not been adequately excavated, and my thesis makes contribution to this task.Arts, Faculty ofPhilosophy, Department ofGraduat