La douleur comme « matrice » de la vie intérieure chez Nietzsche

This paper attempts to put some order among the different notions of pain that are to be found in the Nietzschean philosophical corpus. It tries to show that there is a mutation of the Nietzschean concept of pain, from the notion of pain as evaluation to that of pain as localization of a commotion. Therefore pain is not in itself the source of a reaction, but is actually a consequence of a commotion that a reaction has already addressed by the time of the appearance of pain. A deeper notion of pain is therefore sketched here, one that depicts it as an illusory reaction, destined at separating the global commotion of the organism from its alleged localized cause, thus separating the action from the agent and postponing the facing of the global effect of the commotion. It is for this reason that pain becomes a kind of “matrix” for the understanding of our interior life for Nietzsche, as well as a philosophical indicator of his theoretical adversaries. Finally, the end of this article attempts to show that certain positive indications for a different status of pain might serve as guiding lines for the uncovering of a Nietzschean theory of action