The standard definition of security for digital signatures—existential unforgeability—does not ensure certain properties that protocol designers might expect. For example, in many modern signature schemes, one signature may verify against multiple different public keys. It is left to protocol designers to ensure that these properties do not break protocol security goals, often without success. Modern automated protocol analysis tools are able to prove the absence of large classes of attacks on complex real-world protocols such as TLS 1.3 and 5G. However, their abstraction of signatures assumes much more than existential unforgeability, thereby missing several classes of practical attacks. We give a hierarchy of new symbolic models for si...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the app...
Abstract. Cryptographic security for key exchange and secure session establishment protocols is ofte...
International audienceWe show how the Tamarin tool can be used to model and reason about security pr...
The standard definition of security for digital signatures—existential unforgeability—does not ensur...
Analysing the security of cryptographic protocols by hand is a challenging endeavour. It requires su...
Many modern security protocols such as TLS, WPA2, WireGuard, and Signal use a cryptographic primitiv...
Key substitution vulnerable signature schemes are signature schemes that permit an intruder, given a...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
During the last three decades, there has been considerable research devoted to the symbolic analysis...
AbstractWe argue that formal analysis tools for security protocols are not achieving their full pote...
Secrets are the basis of most protocol security, enabling authentication and secrecy over untrusted ...
Given the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical foundations...
Security protocols are programs that secure communications by defining exchange rules on a network. ...
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Thei...
A standard requirement for a signature scheme is that it is existentially unforgeable under chosen m...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the app...
Abstract. Cryptographic security for key exchange and secure session establishment protocols is ofte...
International audienceWe show how the Tamarin tool can be used to model and reason about security pr...
The standard definition of security for digital signatures—existential unforgeability—does not ensur...
Analysing the security of cryptographic protocols by hand is a challenging endeavour. It requires su...
Many modern security protocols such as TLS, WPA2, WireGuard, and Signal use a cryptographic primitiv...
Key substitution vulnerable signature schemes are signature schemes that permit an intruder, given a...
Security protocols are short programs aiming at securing communications over a network. They are wid...
During the last three decades, there has been considerable research devoted to the symbolic analysis...
AbstractWe argue that formal analysis tools for security protocols are not achieving their full pote...
Secrets are the basis of most protocol security, enabling authentication and secrecy over untrusted ...
Given the central importance of designing secure protocols, providing solid mathematical foundations...
Security protocols are programs that secure communications by defining exchange rules on a network. ...
Security protocols are short programs that aim at securing communication over a public network. Thei...
A standard requirement for a signature scheme is that it is existentially unforgeable under chosen m...
Since the 1980s, two approaches have been developed for analyzing security protocols. One of the app...
Abstract. Cryptographic security for key exchange and secure session establishment protocols is ofte...
International audienceWe show how the Tamarin tool can be used to model and reason about security pr...