Non-volatile memories provide energy efficiency, tolerance against power failure, and “instant-on” power-up. These memories are likely to replace traditional volatile memory in next-generation laptops and desktops. However, the move to non-volatile memory introduces new vulnerabilities; sensitive data such as passwords and keys residing in main memory persists across reboots and can be probed during hardware suspension. In this paper, we propose a Memory Encryption Control Unit (MECU) to address the vulnerabilities introduced by non-volatile memories. The MECU encrypts all memory transfers between the level 2 cache and main memory. The keys used to encrypt memory blocks are derived from secret information present on removable authentication...
While the non-volatile memory (NVM) has often been discussed in the context of alternatives to SRAM ...
We propose an hardware solution to several security problems that are difficult to solve on classica...
Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanen...
Due to their high-density and near-zero leakage power consumption, non-volatile memories (NVMs) are ...
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) have the potential to change the memory-storage hierarchy in c...
Several promising non-volatile memories (NVMs) such as magnetic RAM (MRAM), spin-transfer torque RAM...
Cryptographic algorithm implementations are vulnerable to Cold Boot attacks, which consist in exploi...
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) have been considered as promising alternatives of DRAM for fut...
Secure processors enable new sets of applications such as commercial grid computing, software copy-p...
In this paper, we present MemShuffle, an end-to-end mem-ory protection scheme that resists several a...
Trusted computing is an emerging technology to improve the trustworthiness of computing platforms. T...
Recent data breaches have motivated a desire to remove all trust storage platforms (e.g., the cloud)...
Abstract—Unencrypted data appearing on the processor– memory bus can result in security violations, ...
Embedded systems are ubiquitous and widely used in a large spectrum of applications. Sensitive and s...
Phase Change Memory (PCM) is an emerging Non Volatile Memory (NVM) technology that has the potential...
While the non-volatile memory (NVM) has often been discussed in the context of alternatives to SRAM ...
We propose an hardware solution to several security problems that are difficult to solve on classica...
Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanen...
Due to their high-density and near-zero leakage power consumption, non-volatile memories (NVMs) are ...
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) have the potential to change the memory-storage hierarchy in c...
Several promising non-volatile memories (NVMs) such as magnetic RAM (MRAM), spin-transfer torque RAM...
Cryptographic algorithm implementations are vulnerable to Cold Boot attacks, which consist in exploi...
Emerging non-volatile memories (NVMs) have been considered as promising alternatives of DRAM for fut...
Secure processors enable new sets of applications such as commercial grid computing, software copy-p...
In this paper, we present MemShuffle, an end-to-end mem-ory protection scheme that resists several a...
Trusted computing is an emerging technology to improve the trustworthiness of computing platforms. T...
Recent data breaches have motivated a desire to remove all trust storage platforms (e.g., the cloud)...
Abstract—Unencrypted data appearing on the processor– memory bus can result in security violations, ...
Embedded systems are ubiquitous and widely used in a large spectrum of applications. Sensitive and s...
Phase Change Memory (PCM) is an emerging Non Volatile Memory (NVM) technology that has the potential...
While the non-volatile memory (NVM) has often been discussed in the context of alternatives to SRAM ...
We propose an hardware solution to several security problems that are difficult to solve on classica...
Secure semiconductor devices usually destroy key material on tamper detection. However, data remanen...