In secure information flow analysis, the classic Denning restrictions allow a program’s termination to be affected by the values of its H variables, resulting in potential information leaks. In an effort to quantify such leaks, in this work we study a simple imperative language with random assignments. We consider a “stripping” operation on programs and establish a fundamental relationship between the behavior of a well-typed program and of its stripped version; to prove this relationship, we introduce a new notion of fast probabilistic simulation on Markov chains. As an application, we prove that, under the Denning restrictions, well-typed probabilistic programs are guaranteed to satisfy an approximate probabilistic noninterference propert...
We study quantitative reasoning about probabilistic programs. In doing so, we investigate two main a...
We present a new proof rule for proving almost-sure termination of probabilistic programs, including...
AbstractInformation hiding is a general concept which refers to the goal of preventing an adversary ...
In secure information flow analysis, the classic Denning restrictions allow a program’s termination ...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from H (h...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from H (h...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from vari...
In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher level...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
We define several security properties for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference as a conserv...
A program which has access to your sensitive data presents a security threat. Does the program ke...
Abstract—The outputs of a program that processes secret data may reveal information about the values...
Non-interference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information...
International audienceIn recent years, quantitative security techniques have been providing effectiv...
We study quantitative reasoning about probabilistic programs. In doing so, we investigate two main a...
We present a new proof rule for proving almost-sure termination of probabilistic programs, including...
AbstractInformation hiding is a general concept which refers to the goal of preventing an adversary ...
In secure information flow analysis, the classic Denning restrictions allow a program’s termination ...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from H (h...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from H (h...
Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from vari...
In multilevel systems it is important to avoid unwanted indirect information flow from higher level...
We present a technique for measuring the security of a system which relies on a probabilistic proces...
We define several security properties for the analysis of probabilistic noninterference as a conserv...
A program which has access to your sensitive data presents a security threat. Does the program ke...
Abstract—The outputs of a program that processes secret data may reveal information about the values...
Non-interference is a definition of security introduced for the analysis of confidential information...
International audienceIn recent years, quantitative security techniques have been providing effectiv...
We study quantitative reasoning about probabilistic programs. In doing so, we investigate two main a...
We present a new proof rule for proving almost-sure termination of probabilistic programs, including...
AbstractInformation hiding is a general concept which refers to the goal of preventing an adversary ...