Add to ORKGWe show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player zero-sum extensive form game with imperfect information but perfect recall. Our algorithm solves a finite sequence of linear programs and runs in polynomial time. For the case of a perfect information game, we show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in linear time by a simple backwards induction procedure
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player ze...
Interactions among agents can be conveniently described by game trees. In order to analyze a game, i...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
We propose the sequence form as a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recal...
Developing scalable solution algorithms is one of the central problems in computational game theory....
Abstract: The complexity of algorithms that compute strategies or operate on them typically depends ...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
We show how to find a normal form proper equilibrium in behavior strategies of a given two-player ze...
Interactions among agents can be conveniently described by game trees. In order to analyze a game, i...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel showed how to efficiently compute minimax strategies for two-player ...
We propose the sequence form as a new strategic description for an extensive game with perfect recal...
Developing scalable solution algorithms is one of the central problems in computational game theory....
Abstract: The complexity of algorithms that compute strategies or operate on them typically depends ...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...
Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current...