I present in this paper an analysis of the Simulation Argument from a dialectical contextualist’s standpoint. This analysis is grounded on the reference class problem. I begin with describing in detail Bostrom’s Simulation Argument. I identify then the reference class within the Simulation Argument. I also point out a reference class problem, by applying the argument successively to three different reference classes: aware-simulations, imperfect simulations and immersion-simulations. Finally, I point out that there are three levels of conclusion within the Simulation Argument, depending on the chosen reference class, that yield each final conclusions of a fundamentally different nature
There are considerable difficulties in the way of the development of useful and reliable simulation ...
This paper reviews the interest of using context for par-ticipative simulation in virtual environmen...
In this thesis I defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against the Theory Theory of Mind. I do this i...
Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du con...
ABSTRACT. I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I ...
In his 2003 paper “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation” Nick Bostrom argues that it is reasonabl...
Critically examines Nick Bostrom's "Are You Living in a Simulation?" and underlying concepts
In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a compute...
Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and ...
N. Bostrom's simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a compu...
In this article, I discuss the current state of the debate around the simulation hypothesis, the ide...
International audienceThis paper reviews the interest of using context for participative simulation ...
Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are livin...
The current application of the competing context approach to solve ambiguities in context-based reas...
I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in ...
There are considerable difficulties in the way of the development of useful and reliable simulation ...
This paper reviews the interest of using context for par-ticipative simulation in virtual environmen...
In this thesis I defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against the Theory Theory of Mind. I do this i...
Je présente dans cet article une analyse de l’argument de la Simulation selon le point de vue du con...
ABSTRACT. I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I ...
In his 2003 paper “Are You Living in a Computer Simulation” Nick Bostrom argues that it is reasonabl...
Critically examines Nick Bostrom's "Are You Living in a Simulation?" and underlying concepts
In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a compute...
Many philosophical accounts of scientific models fail to distinguish between a simulation model and ...
N. Bostrom's simulation argument and two additional assumptions imply that we likely live in a compu...
In this article, I discuss the current state of the debate around the simulation hypothesis, the ide...
International audienceThis paper reviews the interest of using context for participative simulation ...
Nick Bostrom considered a number of simulations and contended that the probability that we are livin...
The current application of the competing context approach to solve ambiguities in context-based reas...
I present a new argument that we are much more likely to be living in a computer simulation than in ...
There are considerable difficulties in the way of the development of useful and reliable simulation ...
This paper reviews the interest of using context for par-ticipative simulation in virtual environmen...
In this thesis I defend the Simulation Theory of Mind against the Theory Theory of Mind. I do this i...