On the Disanalogy in the Simulation Argument

ABSTRACT. I propose in this paper a solution to the problem arising from the Simulation argument. I describe first Bostrom's Simulation Argument in detail and its inherent problem. I recall then the implicit analogy underlying the Simulation argument. I show then the inadequacy of this analogy, by pointing out a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument and its underlying urn analogy. I point out that such disanalogy is also present within the Emerald case, another thought experiment imagined by John Leslie. I proceed then to build an alternative analogy, which fits more adequately with the human situation corresponding to the Simulation Argument. I draw lastly the consequences of the presence of two alternative analogies on the conclusion of the Simulation Argument. In what follows, I will endeavour to present a solution to the problem posed by the Simulation argument (SA, for short), an argument recently put forth by Nick Bostrom (2003). I describe first the Simulation argument in detail, by emphasising the urn analogy on which the argument is implicitly based. I show then that there exists in fact a disanalogy between the human situation corresponding to SA and the intuitive underlying analogy. I strive then to construct an alternative urn analogy, by describing an experiment that is more analogous to the human situation corresponding to SA. 1. The Simulation argumen