After Georgia v. Ashcroft: The Primacy of Proportionality

This Note argues that the majority in Ashcroft have left courts with an unadministerable standard-not so much for reasons that Justice Souter articulated in his dissent, but rather because the Court provided no guidance on navigating around the myriad of factors in the convoluted totality analyses. Part I examines two cases after Ashcroft which represent different degrees of racial vote dilution: Shirt v. Hazeltine and Session v. Perry. Through other post-Ashcroft cases, Part II teases out the differences (i) between influence districts as injury and remedy and (ii) between a jurisdiction\u27s Section 5 and Section 2 obligations--details closely related to how proportionality is measured. Finally, Part III discusses substantive representation, the ideology that drove much of Ashcroft\u27s analysis. Framing it as a symptom of nonpolarized voting, this Note concludes that endorsement of substantive representation as a device to achieve colorblindness will obscure the causes of polarization