同情について(上)

Nietzsche is famous, or notorious, for his severe attack on the morality of compassion. His criticism of it, however, is not only destructive, but also makes us rethink in what degree one can really have com-passion for one\u27s fellowmen. When we find our neighbors in misery, is it not mere pity that we generally feel for them? To be stricken with the suffering of someone else is one thing; to be sorry without being touched in the flesh is quite another. The current careless confusion of compassion and pity needs to be deliberately examined and criticized. Fortunately, another guide to such distinction can be found in Hannah Arendt\u27s On Revolution. The second chapter of this book, entitled "The Social Question," contains a study of the origin of the morality of compassion. Historically speaking, Rousseau introduced compassion into political theory, while Robespierre brought it to the market-place. What Nietzsche called "the religion of compassion" comes not from Christianity, but directly from the French Revolution, where the capacity to suffer with the poor was glorified as the supreme virtue because of the very lack of solidarity with the people