In this day and age, facts seem to be equally relevant and irrelevant, depending on your view of the so-called post-factual society. In this article, I look closer at facts by using the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, supplemented by J.L. Austin and others. I analyze facts in terms of a) true and real, b) a propositional trait and a narrative trait, and c) independent and dependent on the knower/teller of facts. The analysis forces facts to be viewed not as definition in themselves but as appearing under particular circumstances. These circumstances are characterized by being induced by a profound form of skepticism and calling for objective certainty, a term I borrow from Gunnar Svensson
Remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty present a view according to which all knowledge rests on comm...
The purpose of this article is to sketch out a contrast between the kind of ‘philosophising’ practic...
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy in relation to scepticism succeeds or fails, I ...
Although at first glance, “facts” are the paradigms of straightforwardness, something about facts se...
This paper’s goal is to present a Wittgenstein’s argument against philosophicalrealism, the strong r...
I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate belie...
Today it is said that we live in a condition of post-truth. In this essay, I will query this claim. ...
Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus by telling us that the world is the totality of facts, not things ...
Wittgenstein makes two rather brief comments on\ud persuasion in On Certainty:\ud I can imagine a ma...
"Certainty" occupies an important place in Wittgenstein’s epistemology: it does not belong to the ca...
Recently, two new portrayals of Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) have emerged. Both understand KW as targe...
grantor: University of TorontoSemantic antirealists such as Dummett read Wittgenstein as ...
This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken th...
The common cognoscitive form of access to reality (conesquently\ud exceptis excipiendis) constitutes...
Truth can be treated from at least three viewpoints. First, truth is an ontological concept, subordi...
Remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty present a view according to which all knowledge rests on comm...
The purpose of this article is to sketch out a contrast between the kind of ‘philosophising’ practic...
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy in relation to scepticism succeeds or fails, I ...
Although at first glance, “facts” are the paradigms of straightforwardness, something about facts se...
This paper’s goal is to present a Wittgenstein’s argument against philosophicalrealism, the strong r...
I evaluate non-factive or truth-insensitive accounts of the ordinary concepts used to evaluate belie...
Today it is said that we live in a condition of post-truth. In this essay, I will query this claim. ...
Wittgenstein begins his Tractatus by telling us that the world is the totality of facts, not things ...
Wittgenstein makes two rather brief comments on\ud persuasion in On Certainty:\ud I can imagine a ma...
"Certainty" occupies an important place in Wittgenstein’s epistemology: it does not belong to the ca...
Recently, two new portrayals of Kripke’s Wittgenstein (KW) have emerged. Both understand KW as targe...
grantor: University of TorontoSemantic antirealists such as Dummett read Wittgenstein as ...
This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken th...
The common cognoscitive form of access to reality (conesquently\ud exceptis excipiendis) constitutes...
Truth can be treated from at least three viewpoints. First, truth is an ontological concept, subordi...
Remarks in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty present a view according to which all knowledge rests on comm...
The purpose of this article is to sketch out a contrast between the kind of ‘philosophising’ practic...
In order to consider whether Wittgenstein's strategy in relation to scepticism succeeds or fails, I ...