Strategy and tactics in popular struggles in Latin America

Capitalist democracies face profound crises in the current conjuncture. Latin America, far from being an exception, is one of the most glaring examples of the democratic maladie. The disillusionment with the performance of so-called democratic regimes (though not with the democratic ideal) and the sharp decline in the esteem of political parties has led many observers and activists to conclude that one of the main tasks of the vigorous social movements in the region should be the recreation of democracy, of a new democracy. The democratic frustration, the delegitimation of politics and the public sphere, the demonization of the state and the discrediting of parties and elections granted the social movements a growing role in the ongoing political processes. In accordance with neoliberal ideology, the market and the private sphere, the virtues of individualist strategies of personal promotion and well-being were permanently extolled, while all sorts of collective strategies or actions were regarded as ineffective and anachronistic remnants of the past. An unintended outcome of this new social ethos tirelessly proposed by the right and its ideologues against institutional politics was to open the space to the ‘protagonism of the street’, that is, the vital political life that exists beyond the rigid and disciplinary institutions of bourgeois politics in all societies. This became more and more important in most Latin American countries, leading to the ousting of unpopular presidents in Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina and Brazil, the blocking of reactionary economic plans like gas and water privatization in Bolivia and, most notably, defeating ALCA, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas so cherished by United States and its allies in the region. Now, these series of popular uprisings were the logical consequences of the long period – not yet completely overcome – of neoliberal hegemony, with all its enhanced social tensions, ruptures, exclusions and ever growing levels of economic exploitation and social degradation which, altogether, created the objective conditions for the political mobilization of large sections of Latin America’s populace. Were these plebeian revolts just exceptional episodes expressing popular anger and rage? Or were they the expression of deep-seated demands to move beyond the narrow limits of liberal democracy and the invention of a new democratic model? A sober look at the history of re-democratization would reveal that there was nothing accidental in this impetuous political mobilization and in the tumultuous finale of many democratically elected governments of the region. It is because of this that eighteen presidents – almost all of them obedient clients of Washington – had to step down ahead of time, unable to cope with the overwhelming popular unrest