In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreement–the Total Evidence View (TEV) and the Equal Weight View (EWV)–are both inadequate for substantial reasons. TEV does not issue the correct intuitive verdicts about a number of hypothetical cases of peer disagreement. The same is true for EWV. In addition, EWV does not give any explanation of what is rationally required of agents on the basis of sufficiently general epistemic principles. I will then argue that there is a genuine alternative to both views–the Preemption View (PV)–that fares substantially better in both respects. I will give an outline and a detailed defense of PV in the paper
The epistemology of disagreement concerns the normative question of how you ought to revise your bel...
Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreeme...
This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about th...
In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreem...
In this paper, I consider the problem of peer disagreement: What should one do in a case in which on...
In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disa...
The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumen...
Disagreement is very common in controversial areas such as politics, law, religion, and philosophy, ...
The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease y...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Philosophy, 2010.My aim in this dissertation is t...
This paper investigates Elga’s (2007) Equal Weight View (EWV) and its consequences when understood a...
What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who...
An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer d...
Much of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational responses to disa...
The epistemology of disagreement concerns the normative question of how you ought to revise your bel...
Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreeme...
This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about th...
In this paper, I argue that the two most common views of how to respond rationally to peer disagreem...
In this paper, I consider the problem of peer disagreement: What should one do in a case in which on...
In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disa...
The purpose of this paper is to bring together work on disagreement in both epistemology and argumen...
Disagreement is very common in controversial areas such as politics, law, religion, and philosophy, ...
The equal weight view says that if you discover that you disagree with a peer, you should decrease y...
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rochester. Dept. of Philosophy, 2010.My aim in this dissertation is t...
This paper investigates Elga’s (2007) Equal Weight View (EWV) and its consequences when understood a...
What sort of doxastic response is rational to learning that one disagrees with an epistemic peer who...
An objection that has been raised to the conciliatory stance on the epistemic significance of peer d...
Much of the literature on the epistemology of disagreement focuses on the rational responses to disa...
The epistemology of disagreement concerns the normative question of how you ought to revise your bel...
Epistemologists have recently debated how we should respond to apparent cases of rational disagreeme...
This chapter addresses an ambiguity in some of the literature on rational peer disagreement about th...