This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less on how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner the possibility to mis-behave he might be tempted to do it, and only in this case there is a chance to learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most mod...
Continual surveillance to detect some event is of interest in quite different situations in industry...
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase th...
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not ...
This article considers a principal-agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monit...
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal benefits b...
This paper addresses a problem involving a 'principal' and a potentially large number of 'agents', i...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the design of monitoring schemes in competitive rank-or...
In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to observe public signals accordin...
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most mod...
This paper examines a financier's optimal monitoring intensity in a multi-period financing relations...
This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates ...
Most principals can monitor their agents, but monitoring is usually costly and imperfect. This paper...
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise hi...
It is well known that (exogenous) monitoring inaccuracies hamper the op-portunism supressing functio...
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most mod...
Continual surveillance to detect some event is of interest in quite different situations in industry...
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase th...
This paper shows that monitoring too much a partner in the initial phase of a relationship may not ...
This article considers a principal-agent problem in which the principal has access to a costly monit...
In a principal-agent model with multiple performance measures, we show that the principal benefits b...
This paper addresses a problem involving a 'principal' and a potentially large number of 'agents', i...
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the design of monitoring schemes in competitive rank-or...
In the standard model of dynamic interaction, players are assumed to observe public signals accordin...
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most mod...
This paper examines a financier's optimal monitoring intensity in a multi-period financing relations...
This paper studies a dynamic principal-monitor-agent relation where a strategic principal delegates ...
Most principals can monitor their agents, but monitoring is usually costly and imperfect. This paper...
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to raise hi...
It is well known that (exogenous) monitoring inaccuracies hamper the op-portunism supressing functio...
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most mod...
Continual surveillance to detect some event is of interest in quite different situations in industry...
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate agents to increase th...