Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all formalized as specific instances of a general scheme, called Generalized Non Deducibility on composition (GNDC). This scheme derives from the NDC property we proposed a few years ago for studying information flow in computer systems. The theory is formulated for CryptoSPA, a process algebra we introduced for the specification of cryptographic protocols. One of the advantages of our unifying GNDC-based theory is that formal comparison among security properties become easier, being them all instances of a unique general property. Moreover, the full generality of the approach has helped us in finding a few undocumented attacks on cryptographic protocols
Abstract. This paper presents a framework where dependable systems can be uniformly modeled and depe...
AbstractA real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic pr...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all formalized as specific instances of a...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all formalized as specific instances of a...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all seen as specific instances of a gener...
In the recent years, many formalizations of security properties have been proposed, most of which ar...
AbstractNon Interference [8] has been proposed for modelling and analysing information flow in syste...
Communication is one of the cornerstone of our everyday life. Guaranteeing the security of a communi...
International audienceThere is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of securi...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of at-tackers is often described in terms of me...
Formal analysis of security protocols has been researched the last decades, recent de-velopments int...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is ...
Abstract. This paper presents a framework where dependable systems can be uniformly modeled and depe...
AbstractA real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic pr...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all formalized as specific instances of a...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all formalized as specific instances of a...
Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all seen as specific instances of a gener...
In the recent years, many formalizations of security properties have been proposed, most of which ar...
AbstractNon Interference [8] has been proposed for modelling and analysing information flow in syste...
Communication is one of the cornerstone of our everyday life. Guaranteeing the security of a communi...
International audienceThere is a large amount of work dedicated to the formal verification of securi...
In the analysis of security protocols, the knowledge of at-tackers is often described in terms of me...
Formal analysis of security protocols has been researched the last decades, recent de-velopments int...
Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic operators....
We study and further develop two language-based techniques for analyzing security protocols. One is ...
Abstract. This paper presents a framework where dependable systems can be uniformly modeled and depe...
AbstractA real-time process algebra, enhanced with specific constructs for handling cryptographic pr...
Abstract. Many security protocols fundamentally depend on the algebraic properties of cryptographic ...