To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the corresponding normal-form game to a "canonical extension," which allows each player to adjust his or her move with a certain probability. The commitment measure relates to the average overall adjustment probabilities for which the given Nash equilibrium can be implemented as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the canonical extension
We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of empirical play converges into ...
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
This paper uses properties of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence to compute Na...
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the c...
This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full co...
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional ...
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, ...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditiona...
Commitment is typically modeled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial bi...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payo¤s that the players can achieve by signing (conditional...
A general framework for analyzing finite games will be introduced. The concept of an incentive funct...
We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player...
Nash's Theorem guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria for strategic-form games. The typical pro...
Abstract. This paper investigates the e¤ects of commitments to rule out strategies on the analy-sis ...
We show that the value of commitment is fragile in many standard games. When the follower faces a sm...
We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of empirical play converges into ...
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
This paper uses properties of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence to compute Na...
To quantify a player’s commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the c...
This paper derives the Nash-equilibrium degrees of commitment to a partnership where lack of full co...
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional ...
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, ...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditiona...
Commitment is typically modeled by assigning to one of the players the ability to take an initial bi...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payo¤s that the players can achieve by signing (conditional...
A general framework for analyzing finite games will be introduced. The concept of an incentive funct...
We examine a generic three-stage game for two players with alternating moves, where the first player...
Nash's Theorem guarantees the existence of Nash equilibria for strategic-form games. The typical pro...
Abstract. This paper investigates the e¤ects of commitments to rule out strategies on the analy-sis ...
We show that the value of commitment is fragile in many standard games. When the follower faces a sm...
We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of empirical play converges into ...
We parameterize commitment in leader-follower games by letting the leader publicly choose her action...
This paper uses properties of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence to compute Na...
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