Add to ORKGThe set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by signing (conditional) commitments before playing a Bayesian game coincides with the set of all feasible, incentive compatible and interim individually rational payoffs of the Bayesian game. Furthermore, the various equilibrium payoffs, which are achieved by means of different commitment devices, are also the equilibrium pay- offs of a universal, deterministic commitment game.ou
This paper considers lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment and discusses the respe...
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the c...
Abstract We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of ...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payo¤s that the players can achieve by signing (conditional...
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional ...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, ...
Abstract. We provide a partial characterization of the set of out-come functions that can be support...
This paper presents a Bayesian game model for a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract. We develop t...
Abstract. Real world players often increase their payo¤s by voluntarily com-mitting to play a \u85xe...
This paper considers lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment and discusses the respe...
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the c...
Abstract We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of ...
The set of all Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payo¤s that the players can achieve by signing (conditional...
The set of all Bayesian–Nash equilibrium payoffs that the players can achieve by making conditional ...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
This paper analyzes Bayesian normal form games in which players write contracts that condition their...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Abstract. This paper analyzes a normal form game in which players write contracts that condition the...
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, ...
Abstract. We provide a partial characterization of the set of out-come functions that can be support...
This paper presents a Bayesian game model for a profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) contract. We develop t...
Abstract. Real world players often increase their payo¤s by voluntarily com-mitting to play a \u85xe...
This paper considers lifetime employment contracts as a strategic commitment and discusses the respe...
To quantify a player's commitment in a given Nash equilibrium of a finite dynamic game, we map the c...
Abstract We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of ...