Domestic Society according to Kant\u27s Categorical Imperative : Rights to persons akin to rights to things

This paper discusses the question of why the right of humanity appears within the "Private Right" only in the section on "rights to persons akin to right to things". This section belongs to the "Doctrine of Right" in The Metaphysics of Morals, treats the rights of domestic society, and divides these rights into marriage right, parental right and right of the head of a household. Should the right of humanity then include the property right and the contract right? Yes it should, because the subjects of these rights have the right of humanity to be treated not as mere means for others but at same time as ends for them. Here appears the second formula of Kant\u27s categorical imperative in The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The categorical imperative and the right of humanity should play roles for the property and contract rights. Then why doesn\u27t the term "the right of humanity" appear in the sections on the property and contract rights? It is because the objects of these rights are not persons and thus have no right of humanity; only their subjects have this right. It means on the other hand that the objects of right of domestic society are persons and their right of humanity must be respected. In the case of the marriage right, the objects of this right are indivisible persons, who have unity of the body with the humanity and appeal to the right of humanity, although parts of the body here are used as things under the contract of marriage. Secondly, in the case of the parental right, there is no contract between parents and children. Parents not only can use their children as if they were things but also must respect the right of the humanity of the children\u27s persons. Thirdly, the head of a household has the servants not only under contract but also as persons who appeal to their right of humanity. In this way the right of humanity belongs not only to the subjects of this right but also to the persons who are objects of the right of domestic society. This understanding saves the persons of domestic society from being mere things