Punishing a person based on low unconditional credence in their deservingness to be punished is consistent with retributivist deontological principles. Negative retributivism absolutely prohibits the intentional or knowing infliction of undeserved harm on individuals identified as undeserving, not the intentional or knowing infliction of risks of undeserved harm on individuals. Meanwhile, the knowing infliction of undeserved harm on some unidentified individuals generates not overriding reasons against punishment, but pro tanto reasons against punishment that are to be weighed against other non-overriding reasons for punishment like crime prevention. The upshot is that uncertainty regarding any identified person’s deservingness to be punish...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Punishing a person based on low unconditional credence in their deservingness to be punished is cons...
Punishing a person based on low unconditional credence in their deservingness to be punished is cons...
The retributive principle is that offenders should be punished because and only because they have cu...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed "purposes" text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Michael S. Moore is among the most prominent normative theorists to argue that retributive justice, ...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Two different notions of justice might motivate people to demand punishment of an offender. The offe...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Punishing a person based on low unconditional credence in their deservingness to be punished is cons...
Punishing a person based on low unconditional credence in their deservingness to be punished is cons...
The retributive principle is that offenders should be punished because and only because they have cu...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed purposes text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Robinson supports the proposed "purposes" text of the New American Law Institute Report on Sentencin...
Michael S. Moore is among the most prominent normative theorists to argue that retributive justice, ...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Two different notions of justice might motivate people to demand punishment of an offender. The offe...
Certain moral claims are said to support two types of ‘positive’ retributivist theory of state punis...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...
Harming other people is prima facie wrong. Unless we can be very certain that doing so is justified ...