Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only
We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions b...
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is a frequently used channel to resolve corporate financial distress. In th...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest betwee...
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of in-terest betwe...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
I build a dynamic capital structure model that allows the firm to renegotiate debt with its creditor...
We analyze a distressed firm indebted to many creditors. The firm's owners have the option of choosi...
All remaining errors are my own. Firms often choose to raise capital from multiple creditors even th...
This version: October 2007We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently reso...
In the paper we study the debt valuation and non-flat reorganization boundaries when strategic defau...
We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions b...
Corporate bankruptcies often involve complicated, fragmented capital structures with many layers of ...
In a market-based financial system, credit is held by dispersed creditors, and out-of-court renegoti...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions b...
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is a frequently used channel to resolve corporate financial distress. In th...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest betwee...
Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of in-terest betwe...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
I build a dynamic capital structure model that allows the firm to renegotiate debt with its creditor...
We analyze a distressed firm indebted to many creditors. The firm's owners have the option of choosi...
All remaining errors are my own. Firms often choose to raise capital from multiple creditors even th...
This version: October 2007We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently reso...
In the paper we study the debt valuation and non-flat reorganization boundaries when strategic defau...
We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions b...
Corporate bankruptcies often involve complicated, fragmented capital structures with many layers of ...
In a market-based financial system, credit is held by dispersed creditors, and out-of-court renegoti...
We study theoretically the possibility for the parties to efficiently resolve financial distress by ...
We demonstrate an inherent conflict between ex ante efficient monitoring and liquidation decisions b...
The U.S. Bankruptcy Code is a frequently used channel to resolve corporate financial distress. In th...
In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress....