Habit

Habits have been thematized since the very begin- ning of philosophy. In ancient philosophy, habit indicates the disposition to certain actions or pas- sions, which can be proper either to the individual as a ἕxiB (which is connected with character and attitude) or to the collective as ἦyoB (which is associated with mores and usages). The know- how that is acquired by habit is a possession – whose opposite is privation – that results from repetition and exercise of individual actions, i.e., from experience and practice, which confers stability on human behavior. In this sense, the ἦyoB (habitudo, consuetudo) produces a ἕxiB (habitus), namely, a determined disposition to # Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016 M. Sgarbi (ed.), Encyclopedia of Renaissance Philosophy, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-02848-4_198-1 acting, and constitutes for the human being, as Aristotle says, a second nature. Habits can be of two kinds, namely, the ones that follow the “ratio- nal principle in the proper self” and the others that are “obedient to it as a child to its father” (Eth. Nic. I,13, 1103a3-5); the former, Aristotle calls intel- lectual virtues, the latter moral virtues. “Virtues are engendered in us neither by nature nor yet in violation of nature; nature gives us the capacity to receive them, and this capacity is brought about by habit” (Eth. Nic. II,1, 1103a24-26)