Protecting 802.11-Based Wireless Networks From SCTS and JACK Attacks

The convenience of IEEE 802.11-based wireless access networks has led to widespread deployment. However, these applications are predicated on the assumption of availability and confidentiality. Error-prone wireless networks afford an attacker considerable flexibility to exploit the vulnerabilities of 802.11-based mechanism. Two of most famous misbehaviors are selfish and malicious attacks. In this thesis we investigate two attacks: Spurious CTS attack (SCTS) and Jamming ACK attack (JACK). In the SCTS, malicious nodes may send periodic Spurious CTS packets to force other nodes to update their NAV values and prevent them from using the channel. In the JACK, an attacker ruins legitimate ACK packets for the intention of disrupting the traffic flow and draining the battery energy of victim nodes quickly. Correspondingly, we propose solutions: termed Carrier Sensing based Discarding (CSD), and Extended Network Allocation Vector (ENAV) scheme. We further demonstrate the performance of our proposed schemes through analysis and NS2 simulations