We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to play when players can communicate. We consider two variants, modelling talk about future plans and talk about past actions. The language from which messages are chosen is endogenous, messages are allowed to be vague. We focus on equilibria where messages are believed whenever possible, thereby develop a theory of credible communication. Predictions confirm the longstanding intuition for Aumann’s (1990) Stag Hunt game which applies directly to an investment game with positive spillovers. Our results shed new light on the multiplicity of equilibria in economic applications
A solution concept maps strategic games into strategy predictions. Nash equilibrium is the most wide...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordThe paper e...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
A solution concept maps strategic games into strategy predictions. Nash equilibrium is the most wide...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
We explore in an equilibrium framework whether games with multiple Nash equilibria are easier to pla...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
Games with multiple Nash equilibria are believed to be easier to play if players can communicate. We...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and re...
This is the final version. Available on open access from Wiley via the DOI in this recordThe paper e...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
A solution concept maps strategic games into strategy predictions. Nash equilibrium is the most wide...
The paper analyzes the role of the structure of communication - i.e. who is talking with whom - on t...
The effectiveness of pre-play communication in achieving efficient outcomes has long been a subject...