Add to ORKGNonunanimous voting processes seldom possess voting equilibria if the number of alternatives is large. The discovery of this fact has led to an intense search for new “solution concepts” for voting games that are capable of predicting outcomes in cases in which equilibria fail to exist. The reader is referred to papers by Kramer (1977), Fiorina and Shepsle (this volume), and Riker (this volume) for examples and further discussion
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-t...
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. Af...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
In this note we discuss two examples of appoval voting games. The first one, with six voters and thr...
Abstract. This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. W...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
This paper considers voting situations in which the vote takes place iteratively. If a coalition rep...
peer reviewedThis short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stabl...
It is well known that group decision processes (of which voting processes are an important special c...
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. Af...
In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a s...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equili...
From the perspective of some common criteria for evaluating voting procedures, the results we offer ...
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-t...
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. Af...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
In this note we discuss two examples of appoval voting games. The first one, with six voters and thr...
Abstract. This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. W...
International audienceThis paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper vo...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...
This paper considers voting situations in which the vote takes place iteratively. If a coalition rep...
peer reviewedThis short note studies the noncooperative foundations of von Neumann–Morgenstern stabl...
It is well known that group decision processes (of which voting processes are an important special c...
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. Af...
In this paper we discuss three examples of approval voting games. The first one illustrates that a s...
We describe voting mechanisms to study voting systems as well as electoral systems and parliamentary...
Trembling hand (TH) equilibria were introduced by Selten in 1975. Intuitively, these are Nash equili...
From the perspective of some common criteria for evaluating voting procedures, the results we offer ...
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where game-t...
We consider the problem of a society whose members must choose from a finite set of alternatives. Af...
We prove two results on the generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in voting games. The first one i...