The Effect of Bidding Information in Ascending Auctions

We study the effect of the drop out and reenter information in an environment where bidders‟ values involve both private and common value components. We find that (1) providing bidding information does not have a significant effect on expected revenue and expected efficiency. (2) The effect of information on winner‟s expected profit depends on the range of uncertainty of the common value component and the level of Nash profit prediction, which the auctioneer has no a priori knowledge. In our environment, where bidders have a private component to their value and the auction takes place in ascending clock format, (3) bidders do not suffer from the winner‟s curse when information is not provided. (4) Information substantially increases the variability of revenue and winner‟s profit when the range of uncertainty of the common value component is large. (5) Bidders‟ response to information depends on the range of uncertainty