Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by written consent remain intact. A key reason that these antitakeover provisions persist rests in the widely held view that giving shareholders the right to act by written consent would not increase their power over the company’s management as long as shareholders already have the right to call a special meeting. This Note argues that this view is wrong. The written-consent right does uniquely empower shareholders. That power results not from what the right allows shareholders to do but from what it prevents boards from doing without shareholder consent
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
Part I examines in greater detail the role of shareholders in public corporations. Part II critiques...
This article examines a new corporate law remedy: the ability of courts to remove directors of busin...
Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by wr...
The vitality of the takeover market is approaching a critical juncture. Certain incumbent management...
A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether shareholders or managers s...
More often than not discussion about shareholders has been around the idea of shareholder rights. Th...
Many commentators assert that enhanced shareholder power is a promising cure for corporate governanc...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting powe...
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of hostile share acquisitions o...
The shareholder empowerment debate in corporate law is premised upon a reoccurring assumption that, ...
The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived...
State corporate laws require shareholder approval for corporate charter amendments, but only the boa...
Article published in law review.For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
Part I examines in greater detail the role of shareholders in public corporations. Part II critiques...
This article examines a new corporate law remedy: the ability of courts to remove directors of busin...
Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by wr...
The vitality of the takeover market is approaching a critical juncture. Certain incumbent management...
A significant debate rages within corporate law scholarship as to whether shareholders or managers s...
More often than not discussion about shareholders has been around the idea of shareholder rights. Th...
Many commentators assert that enhanced shareholder power is a promising cure for corporate governanc...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting powe...
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of hostile share acquisitions o...
The shareholder empowerment debate in corporate law is premised upon a reoccurring assumption that, ...
The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived...
State corporate laws require shareholder approval for corporate charter amendments, but only the boa...
Article published in law review.For many years academics have debated whether it is better to permit...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
Part I examines in greater detail the role of shareholders in public corporations. Part II critiques...
This article examines a new corporate law remedy: the ability of courts to remove directors of busin...