Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by written consent remain intact. A key reason that these antitakeover provisions persist rests in the widely held view that giving shareholders the right to act by written consent would not increase their power over the company’s management as long as shareholders already have the right to call a special meeting. This Note argues that this view is wrong. The written-consent right does uniquely empower shareholders. That power results not from what the right allows shareholders to do but from what it prevents boards from doing without shareholder consent
Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will a...
This Article argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured--which can be done by making...
In the past decades, shareholder democracy has been the center of attention in corporate governance ...
Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by wr...
More often than not discussion about shareholders has been around the idea of shareholder rights. Th...
The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived...
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of hostile share acquisitions o...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
A number of corporate law scholars have recently proposed granting shareholders an enhanced right to...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
Shareholders have full contractual freedom to decide and agree between themselves on how to exercise...
The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting powe...
The vitality of the takeover market is approaching a critical juncture. Certain incumbent management...
Corporate bylaws are the new leading edge of a decades-long struggle between shareholders and manage...
This paper develops a theory of corporate decision making to study the benefits and costs of shareho...
Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will a...
This Article argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured--which can be done by making...
In the past decades, shareholder democracy has been the center of attention in corporate governance ...
Despite a decline in companies’ takeover defenses, provisions barring shareholders from acting by wr...
More often than not discussion about shareholders has been around the idea of shareholder rights. Th...
The great corporate scandals of the recent past and the resulting push for legal reform have revived...
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of hostile share acquisitions o...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
A number of corporate law scholars have recently proposed granting shareholders an enhanced right to...
The key findings of this dissertation indicate that the benefits and costs associated with sharehold...
Shareholders have full contractual freedom to decide and agree between themselves on how to exercise...
The default rules of corporate law make shareholders’ control rights a function of their voting powe...
The vitality of the takeover market is approaching a critical juncture. Certain incumbent management...
Corporate bylaws are the new leading edge of a decades-long struggle between shareholders and manage...
This paper develops a theory of corporate decision making to study the benefits and costs of shareho...
Shareholders have many legal rights, but they are not all of equal significance. This article will a...
This Article argues that once undistorted shareholder choice is ensured--which can be done by making...
In the past decades, shareholder democracy has been the center of attention in corporate governance ...