Add to ORKGNo man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he wül hold to the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon. ^ This well known Biblical admonition about conflicted loyalties exemplifies the purpose behind shareholder primacy—the legal principle that has long played an integral part in corporate governance in the United States.^ It is a fundamental premise of corporate law that when carrying out the corporation\u27s affairs, officers and directors owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders, not to any other constituency.-\u27 These exclusive duties give investors some measure of certainty that when they invest capital in an enterprise, their in...
Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors\u27 Fiduciary Obligations in For-Pro...
In this article, the authors contend that the interests of shareholders must be\ud the paramount con...
This paper is the second in a series considering the argument that corporate laws that give only rig...
Book Chapter Julian Velasco, Shareholder Primacy in Benefit Corporations, in Fiduciary Obligations i...
From the publisher The goal of the business corporation traditionally has been understood to be the ...
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are t...
This article proposes an integrative solution to the modern debate on corporate purpose, the questio...
Prominent theories of corporate governance frequently adopt primacy as an organizing theme. Sharehol...
The company is a legal structure designed to bring together the different parties of a firm—its empl...
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn...
Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of shareholders. Courts announce that s...
The central command of corporate governance law is that directors must serve the shareholder interes...
In 1932, the Harvard Law Review published a debate between two preeminent corporate scholars on the ...
The power of the American consumer is well established. Consumers wishing to encourage certain busin...
The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder...
Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors\u27 Fiduciary Obligations in For-Pro...
In this article, the authors contend that the interests of shareholders must be\ud the paramount con...
This paper is the second in a series considering the argument that corporate laws that give only rig...
Book Chapter Julian Velasco, Shareholder Primacy in Benefit Corporations, in Fiduciary Obligations i...
From the publisher The goal of the business corporation traditionally has been understood to be the ...
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are t...
This article proposes an integrative solution to the modern debate on corporate purpose, the questio...
Prominent theories of corporate governance frequently adopt primacy as an organizing theme. Sharehol...
The company is a legal structure designed to bring together the different parties of a firm—its empl...
For decades, those holding the shareholder primacy view that the purpose of a corporation is to earn...
Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of shareholders. Courts announce that s...
The central command of corporate governance law is that directors must serve the shareholder interes...
In 1932, the Harvard Law Review published a debate between two preeminent corporate scholars on the ...
The power of the American consumer is well established. Consumers wishing to encourage certain busin...
The shareholder primacy norm defines the objective of the corporation as maximization of shareholder...
Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of Directors\u27 Fiduciary Obligations in For-Pro...
In this article, the authors contend that the interests of shareholders must be\ud the paramount con...
This paper is the second in a series considering the argument that corporate laws that give only rig...
