Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of shareholders. Courts announce that shareholders are critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power - by directors and officers over vast aggregations of property that they do not own. At the same time shareholders have a very difficult time actually making any corporate decisions. In this Article, we strive to define a new role for shareholders by drawing on economic theories of the firm and the structure of corporate law. More particularly we examine the role of shareholders in hostile corporate takeovers, the area where the interests of shareholders and directors collide most dramatically, and highlight a necessary sacred space for shareholder self-help, free o...
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated p...
This article proposes a new, functional explanation of the different roles of non-shareholder groups...
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are t...
Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of shareholders. Courts announce that s...
Concern over issues of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance persists, fueled, in...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corp...
Corporate bylaws are the new leading edge of a decades-long struggle between shareholders and manage...
Prevailing theories of corporate law tend to rely heavily on strong claims regarding the corporate g...
Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporation...
After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S. corporate law—the se...
This Article focuses on the conventional theory that a corporation is owned by its stockholders and ...
According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation. Until relatively recently, ...
This article proposes an integrative solution to the modern debate on corporate purpose, the questio...
This chapter from the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill &...
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated p...
This article proposes a new, functional explanation of the different roles of non-shareholder groups...
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are t...
Corporate law expresses a profound ambiguity toward the role of shareholders. Courts announce that s...
Concern over issues of corporate social responsibility and corporate governance persists, fueled, in...
This Article analyzes the allocation of the power to decide on hostile takeovers as between director...
Corporations are vulnerable to the greed, self-dealing and conflicts of those in control of the corp...
Corporate bylaws are the new leading edge of a decades-long struggle between shareholders and manage...
Prevailing theories of corporate law tend to rely heavily on strong claims regarding the corporate g...
Corporate law and scholarship generally assume that professional managers control public corporation...
After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S. corporate law—the se...
This Article focuses on the conventional theory that a corporation is owned by its stockholders and ...
According to the traditional view, the shareholders own the corporation. Until relatively recently, ...
This article proposes an integrative solution to the modern debate on corporate purpose, the questio...
This chapter from the forthcoming Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (Claire Hill &...
The consensus around shareholder primacy is crumbling. Investors, long assumed to be uncomplicated p...
This article proposes a new, functional explanation of the different roles of non-shareholder groups...
The fundamental assumptions of corporate law have changed little in decades. Accepted as truth are t...